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"Humanae Vitae" and the
Principle of Totality
Ralph Mcinerny

Th e ali/ho r. th e Michael P. Grace ProFessor of Medieval Studies at the
Unil'ersity of" No tre Dame. presented this paper at the 2nd International
Co nFerence on Moral Theology in Rome in November. 1988.
Putamus nostrae aetatis
homines aptissimos esse ad
perspiciendum , quam haec
doctrina sit humanae rationi
consentanea . (HV, n. 12)
Pope Paul VI's prediction 10 "Humanae Vitae" that his
contemporaries were pa rticularly well disposed to see that the
inseparability of the unitive and procreative meanings of the conjugal act
precludes contraception has not, in the short term, been borne out, at
least if one is guided by the amplified voices of dissenters . It is ironic that
a general confidence in people of our day should have had so fragile a
basi s among so me of the faithful themselves , even those to whom the
Church has entrusted the teaching of moral theology. It was precisely to
this insepara ble connection between the unitive and procreative
meanings of the conjugal act that Cardinal Ratzinger appealed in the
" Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origins and on the Dignity
of Procreation". Many have noted the symmetry between " Humanae
Vitae" and the "Instruction on Respect for Life". It is the same principle
that forbids separately the unitive from the procreative meanings in
contraceptive sex and the separating of the procreative from the unitive
in homologous artificial fertilization.
In this paper, after reflecting on that principle, I want to consider
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the objection to it , based on the so-called "principle of totality", a
symmetrical form of which has surfaced in reaction to the "Instruction on
Respect for Life".
I. Unitive and Procreative Meanings

The second part of "Humanae Vitae" running from n. 7 through 18 is
called, in one English translation , Doctrinal Principles. The Holy Father
urges a proper understanding of the nature of the conjugal act, on the one
had, and of responsible parenthood , on the other, since these have been
appealed to on behalf of behavior traditionally regarded as immoral.
Quocirca per mutuam sui
donationem , quae ips o rum propria
est et exclusoria, coniuges
illam persequuntur personarum
communionem. qua se invicem
perficiant . ut ad novorum
viventium procreationem et
educationem cum Deo operam
sociant. (HV. n. 8)

By means of the reciprocal
pe rsonal gift which is pro per
and exclusive to them. husband
and wife tend toward that
communion o f their beings
whereby they help each other
toward personal perfecti o n in
order to collaborate with God
in the begetting and rearing. of
new lives. (Ca legari tra ns. )

This understanding of the marriage act is taken to be that which all men
should have on the basis of natural reason. Pius VI then added that for
baptized persons marriage takes on the dignity of a sacramental sign of
grace and represents the union of Christ and the Church.
The characteristics and demands of spousal love which the encyclical
then develops are four. It is human , that is, a love both sensible and
spiritual. As a human act , spousal love is an act of deliberative will
bearing on the use of our bodies in such a way as to promote an enduring
union between man and wife and their mutual attainment of human
perfection . It is a total and mutual giving of self, faithful and exclusive
until death, which by its very nature is fruitful , ordered to bring new lives
into existence.
Clearly this is a description of this human act as it ought to be , but
these demands are exigencies of the act itself; it is am oral ideal that can
and should be realized ; that is, it is the measure of each instance of such
activity . The doctrine of the encyclical is sometimes described as an
"ideal" which should be acknowledged, but apparently not as one that
can and should be realized . This kind of acceptance of"Humanae Vitae"
as the expression of an unrealizable ideal which should nonetheless gain
our assent is, of course, a rejection of and dissent from it. To characterize
practical advice as in effect impractical is a somewhat Pickwickian way to
praise it, let alone accept it.
Paul VI's remarks about responsible parenthood continue to develop a
moral ideal on the basis of the nature of spousal love as human action .
"Quoniam humana ratio in facultate vitae procreandae biologicas
deprehendit leges, quae ad humanam personam pertinent: the intellect
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discovers in the power of giving life biological laws that are part of the
human person." (n. 10) The reference here is to the "Summa theologiae",
Ia IIae, q. 94, a . 2, where practical reason's judgment concerning the
pursuit of the goods which are the object of natural inclinations are called
the first principles of natural law. The biological laws are not themselves
precepts of natural law, needless to say. Practical reason directs acts of
deliberate will which bear on the ends of natural inclinations.
Porro ea , de qua loquimur,
conscia paternitas praecipue
aliam eamque intimam secum fert
rationem , pertinentem ad ordinem
moraiem. quem obiectivum vocant,
a Deoque statutum, cuius recta
conscientia est vera interpres.
Quapropter paternitatis consciae
munus id postulat, ut coniuges
sua officia erga Deum, erga
seipsos. erga familiam. erga
humanam societatem agnoscant,
rerum bonorumque ordine recte
servato. (HY. n. 10 in fine)

Responsible parenthood also and
above all implies a more
profound relationship to the
objective moral order
established by God, and of
which a right conscience is the
faithful interpreter. The
responsible exercise of
pare nthood implies, therefore,
that spouses recognize fully
their duties toward God , toward
themselves , toward the family
and society, in a correct
hierarchy of va lues.

It is against this background that Paul VI says that the Church is calling
men back to the observance of the norms of natural law when she says
that each and every conjugal act must remain open to the transmission of
life. (HV, n. II)
Humanly to engage in sexual activity is to respect the end and purpose
of the activity engaged in and to relate it to the total good of the person,
the marriage, the family, society, God. The conjugal act, sexual activity
as engaged in by responsible human agents, both unites the partners and
enables them to generate new life.
Quodsi utraque eiusmodi
essential is ratio, unitatis
videlicet et procreationis,
servatur, usus matrimonii sensum
mutui verique amoris suumque
ordinem ad celsissimum
paternita tis munus omnino
retinet. ad quod homo vocatur.
(HY, n. 12)

By safeguarding both these
essential aspects, the unitive
and the procreative, the
conjugal act preserves in its
fullness the sense of mutual
love and its orientation to
man's most high vocation to
parenthood.

It is the profoundly reasonable and human character of this principle
that , to return to my beginning, caused the Holy Father to think that men
nowadays were particularly capable of confirming it. Why? Because of
our readiness to see that for one spouse to force the conjugal act on the
other with out regard to particular circumstances and desires is no act of
love and is in fact "a denial of the right moral order in the relations
between spouses." A forced act of mutual giving meant to enhance
personal union as well as transmit life is a contradiction of the act, not an
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instance of it. The Pope's assumption that this would be readily seen does
not seem overly optimistic. So he goes on.
Pariter, si rem considerent,
fateantur oportet, actum amoris
mutui, qui facultati vitam
propagandi detrimento sit, quam
Deus omnium Creator secundum
peculia res leges in ea
insculpsit, refragari tum divino
consilio, ad cuius normam
coniugium constitutum est, tum
voluntati primae vitae humanae
Auctoris. (HY, n. 13)

By parity of reasoning, one who
reflects carefully must also
recognize that an act of mutual
love that prejudices the
capacity to transmit life that
God the Creator, according to
particular laws inserted
therein is in contradiction
with the design constitutive
of marriage and with the will
of the Author of Life.

What is the argument? The umtIve and procreative meanings of the
conjugal act are inseparable from it. A forced conjugal act destroys the
unitive meaning; contraception destroys the procreative meaning.
Neither is an appropriate instance of the act; both are negations of the
nature of the act. That is what Pope Paul VI thought men of our day are
particularly ready to accept.
II. The Principle of Totality
When at the outset of "Humanae Vitae" Paul VI lists some of the
reasons why it was thought necessary to take a new look at the traditional
Church teaching on marriage, reasons he states with fairness and
sympathy, he identifies one putative basis for reconsideration as based on
the principle of totality.
An praeterea, principio
totalitatis, quod appellant, in
hac re adhibito, non liceat
arbitrari consilium fecunditatis
minus uberis, sed magis rationi
consentaneae, posse act urn,
physice sterilitatem afferentem,
in licitam providamque gignendae
prolis moderationem vertere. An
videlicet fas non sit opinari
finem procreandae prolis potius
ad totam coniugum vitam, quam ad
singulos quosque eius actus
pertinere. (HY, n. 3)

Or else, by extending to this
field the application of the socalled 'principle of
totality; could one not admit
that the intention or a less
abundant but more rationally
controlled fertility transforms
a materially sterilizing
intervention into a permissible
and wise control of births?
Could one not admit, in other
words, that the procreative
finality pertains to conjugal
life taken as a whole, rather
than to its single acts?

Not only does the encyclical cite this argument, it responds to it.
Nonetheless, dissenters sometimes invoked it as if the Pope had
overlooked it.2 It underscores the symmetry of"Humanae Vitae" and the
"Instruction on Respect for Life", that the principle of totality should be
invoked in dissenting from the latter to suggest that a couple's having
recourse to homologous artificial fertilization can be justified if attention
is paid to the whole story of their life together.
May, 1989
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There is, I would say, good reason to consider contraception, IVF and AIH as
capable of enhancing the natural course of a marital life in the same way that a
caesarean section and bottle-feeding with special supplements do. There can be
artifice and technology that enhance nature. But that needs to be evaluated within
the full continuity and integrity of a couple's sexual life. The moral worth of
technical intervention would derive from whether the union itself was generous
between the spouses and toward offspring."'

Prof. Oliver O'Donovan of Oxford objected that in "Humanae Vitae",
"Chastity in marriage was analyzed into a series of particular acts of
sexual union, a proceeding which carried with it an unwitting but
unmistakable hint of the pornographic." Since Burtchaell cites
O'Donovan at some length, it can be assumed that what the Oxonian has
to say of "Humanae Vitae" as well as of the "Instruction on Respect for
Life" is considered a high example of the defense of the principle of
totality.
A married couple do not know each other in isolated moments or one-night
stands. Their moment s of sexual union are point s of focus for a physical
relationship which must properly be predicated of the whole extent of their life
together. Thus . the virtue of chastity as openness to procreation cannot be
accounted for in terms of a repeated sequence of chaste acts, each of which is
open to procreation. The chastity of a couple is more than the chastity of their
acts, though it is not irrespecti ve of it either 4

Burtchaell and O'Donovan provide us with fairly recent statements of the
way the principle of totality is invoked to justify what the Church
condemns. I find a very curious theory of action lurking behind their
remarks and I think it will be useful to bring it out into the open, the more
so because it seems to me that the principle the two men invoke provides a
very feeble defense of what they have set out to champion . 5
How does "Humanae Vitae" reply to the argument based on the
principle of totality? Reconsideration has led the Holy Father to declare
once again that "cum quis dono Dei utitur, tollens, licet solum ex parte,
significationem et finem doni ipsius , sive viri sive mulieris naturae
repugnant eorumque intimae necessitudini, ac propterea etiam Dei
consilio sanctaeque eius voluntati obnititur: those who make use of this
divine gift while destroying it, even if only partially, its significance and its
finality, act contrary to the nature of both man and woman and of their
most intimate relationship, and therefore contradict also the plan of God
and his wilL" (n . 13) Given this judgment, following on the very nature of
the conjugal act, the dismissal of the argument for contraception based on
the principle of totality is inevitable.
Neljue vero. ad eos coniugales
actus comprobandos ex industria
fecund itate privatos. haec
argumcnta ut va lida affcrrc

02

And to justify conjugal acts
made intentionally infertile
one cannot in\'oke as valid
reasons the lesse r ev il. or the
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licet: nempe, id malum elegendum
esse, quod minus grave videatur;
insuper eosdem actus in unum
quoddam coalescere cum actibus
fecundis iam antea positis vel
postea ponendis, atque adeo
horum unam atque parem moralem
bonitatem participare. Verum
enimvero, si malum morale
tolerare, quod minus grave sit,
interdum licet, ut aliquod maius
vitetur malum vel aliquod
praestantius [bonum promoveatur,
numquam tamen licet, ne ob
gravissimas quidem caucas,
facere mala ut eveniant bona ...

fact that when taken together
with the fertile acts already
performed or to follow later,
such acts would coalesce into a
whole and hence would share in
one and the same moral
goodness. In truth, if it is
sometimes permissible to
tolerate a lesser moral evil in
order to avoid a greater evil
or to promote a greater good,
it is not permissible, not even
for the gravest reasons, to do
evil so that good may follow
therefrom.

(HV, n. 14)

Paul VI must, of course, view the argument drawn from totality as
violating the principle that evil may not be done that good might come. A
conjugal act so engaged in that it is directly rendered infertile is a denial of
one of the very meanings of the act - its procreative signification. As such,
contraceptive sex is morally wrong. To engage in contraceptive sex on the
assumption that good things will thereby come about for the couple and
their family is to do an evil that good may come.
Those who dispute this do not, of course, want to allow that the
contraceptive act is immoral. To avoid this, they suggest another way of
appraising actions, not one at a time, but as elements in a moral unity
which is the whole marriage . O'Donovan agrees that without
subordination to the couple's quest for fruitfulness in their union,
homologous artificial fertilization would be an offensive act. By parity of
reasoning, presumably, the contraceptive act would have to be
subordiriate to the couple's quest for union . Or perhaps in either case the
subordination is to the couple's quest for union and fruitfulness. The point
of the dissent in any case is that the act taken singly has no moral value.
This must be distinguished from the tack taken by Burtchaell in the
passage quoted above, where contraception, IFH, AIH, caesarean
sections and bottle-feeding were lumped together as all involving artifice
and technology. It is, of course, disingenuous to read the Instruction as
expressive of a Luddite distrust for technology, since it goes out of its way
to make clear that is not the point. 6 Despite this lapse on Burtchaell's part
as to what the principle of totality is taken to justify (surely the questions
raised about contraception and homologous artificial fertilization are not
raised about caesarean sections and bottle feeding), his statement of the
principle is helpful. "The moral worth of technical intervention would
May, 1989
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derive from w.hetheL the _union.itself was,generous between the. spouses .
and toward offspring."7
Kierkegaard contrasted what he called the aesthetic sphere, symbolized
by the seducer, and the ethical sphere, symbolized by the husband,
The former is episodic, the repetition of moments, the same damned
thing over and over; this note of the aesthetic is captured by Leporello's
aria in "Don Giovanni", citing his master's conquests ----; one thousand
and three in Spain alone! The ethical, on the other hand, involves the
acquiring of a history by surmounting the moment and developing a life.
Those who invoke the principle of totality remind us that marriage is a
pact meant to last a lifetime, that the spouses enter into it with an eye to
the long haul, pledging their love until death do them part. A marriage is
thus a mutual effort to acquire a character, to do well a work that neither
spouse can do alone. The marriage is somehow a whole that is greater
than its parts and it is the whole which confers moral value on the parts,
not the other way around.
The theory was not invented ad hoc to discuss marriage. It is a theory
about the moral life as such seemingly reminiscent of Aristotle's, "One
swallow does not make a spring." One good action does not give us a
good character; and of course when virtue is had, a good character
gained, it is a cause of further good acts, not simply their effect. The
attractiveness of the appeal to totality, then, is that it calls attention to
features of the moral life which have long been recognized. It seems clear
that those who invoke it have in mind such home truths as that a human
life does not consist of a single episode, that the moral life is a task over
time in which a history is acquired and we become the kind of person we
morally are.
Nonetheless, the principle of totality seems to me to be quite different
from the tradition it apparently evokes, a sign of which is that neither a
Kierkegaard nor an Aristotle would have accepted the theory of action
thought to be implied by the principle of totality. 8 Kierkegaard's notion
that the ethical life is the acquisition of a history never leads him to
suggest that the acts making it up should be, on the average, good . No
more does Aristotle, insofar as he distinguishes between a good action
and a good character, think that actions taken one at a time cannot be
morally appraised, Surely the goodness or badness ofthe moral life taken
as a whole is essentially dependent on the goodness or badness of the acts
which make it up. If this is so, it cannot be the case that the individual acts
are what they are morally because they are components of a good life.
Surely when we say of someone that he has lived a good life, we are
speaking of the constituent acts of his life. The life is good because the
acts which make it up are good, not the other way around .
The proponents of the principle of totality would not want to
countenance an act of marital infidelity by saying that when absorbed
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into the marriage taken as a whole, it loses its negative note. Yet they seem
to invite such an appeal. 9 Say it is a single lapse. Our attitude toward the
unfaithful partner would be a good deal different than it would be if such
infidelity were frequent; the one time adulterer is not as bad as the married
philanderer. True as that is, it in no way alters the fact that the act of
adultery as such is morally wrong. One sin does not make a vicious person
anymore than one good act makes one virtuous. But it is single acts which
are the primary carriers of moral quality and are good or bad. Perhaps what
misleads here is confusing habits or character and acts. One must have a
track record of a certain kind before we account him courageous or just. But
he will acquire the desired character by means of acts of a certain moral
kind.1O
The conceptual question facing the proponents of the principle of
totality, then, seems unanswerable. How can a plurality of acts have a
moral character denied to each of them taken singly? To speak of single
acts as episodes suggests that they can have no moral value as such. But if
they cannot, neither can the life of which they form parts. The married
life of a couple may ideed in the main be made up of morally good
conjugal acts, but this provides no basis for saying that this contraceptive
conjugal act is not bad. To say that it is good because it is an episode in a
good life will entail denying that the single act of adultery is wrong. We
may have to wait years before we can confidently say that the spouses
have a good married life, but in the meantime they must act and the deeds
they do must meet presently applicable moral standards. On the basis of
the dissenters' appeal to the principle of totality, "Make me chaste, Lord ,
but not yet," could become an exculpating principle of universal
application.
Those who dissent from "Humanae Vitae" on the basis of the principle
of totality have, in fact, no basis for dissent. They admit that the life of the
spouses will be morally good only if it is one of generosity toward one
another and toward offspring, and this seems an acceptance of the unitive
and procreative meanings as essential to married life taken as a whole.
But if these two meanings can only be honored in singular acts, on which
basis the married life taken as a whole is said derivatively to honor them,
it is in singular acts that the moral significance of the spouses' life will lie.
The principle of totality cannot ground the claim that singular acts
which, taken as such, are offensive, cease to be so when considered in the
light of the moral life taken as a whole. The moral imperative is not that
we should act well more often than not. Rather it is: Do good and avoid
evil.
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